The 6th Plenum of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) concluded on October 11, 2006, with the commitment to establish a harmonious society by 2020. The obvious implication from this commitment is that the present major social, economic and political trends are not leading to a harmonious society or, at least, not leading to a harmonious society fast enough. Analytically, if the Chinese economy is depicted as a speeding car, there are three classes of failures (a) a hardware failure from the breakdown of an economic mechanism, a development that is analogous to the collapse of the chassis of the car; (b) a software failure from a flaw in governance that creates frequent widespread social disorders that disrupt production economy-wide and discourage private investment, a situation similar to a car crash that resulted from a fight among the people inside the speeding car; and (c) a power supply failure from hitting either a natural limit or an externally-imposed limit, a situation that is akin, respectively, to the car running out of gas or to the car smashing into a barrier erected by an outsider. For hardware failure we discuss the possible weakening of China's fiscal position generated by the repeated recapitalization of the state banks. For software failure, we discuss possible social disorder caused by outmoded governance. And for power supply failure, we discuss the possible trade disputes from China's chronic trade imbalances and the physical constraints posed by China's rapidly deteriorating natural environment.
the most astute of China analysts, Minxin Pei (2006a) , has argued that China is now in a trapped transition that is described as "a transformative phase in which half-finished reforms have transferred power to new, affluent elites" 2 who are using crony capitalism to generate high economic growth that is not sustainable. He felt that meaningful reform to ensure continued high growth was improbable. 3 Pei's pessimism about the inevitable exhaustion of China's growth momentum is shared by another leading China scholar, Yasheng Huang (2008) . In Huang's contrarian assessment, China in 1999 was actually less capitalistic than China in 1989. He asserted that the administration of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, that ended in March 2003, had reversed the march toward capitalism by systematically promoting the growth of large state-owned firms in the urban areas and suppressing the activities of the privately-owned small and medium firms in the countryside. Huang has attributed the deterioration in income distribution across classes and across regions to this reoccupation of the commanding heights of the economy by state-controlled companies (often in cahoots with foreign private companies), and the intensification of discrimination against the domestic private firms. Because Huang believes (very reasonably, based on international experience) that the state-controlled firms are intrinsically less innovative than the domestic private firms, he concludes that China is unlikely to be able to move on to the next stage of economic development in the near future (at least not before India does so 4 ).
THE ROAD TO PROSPERITY MIGHT NOT BE A SMOOTH ONE
This long tradition of forecasting gloom and doom about China is really quite surprising because China's economy has been like a speeding car for almost thirty years. Hence, not surprisingly, it is becoming more common to hear glowingly optimistic assessments of China's future than dismissively pessimistic ones. For example, Jim O'Neill, Dominic Wilson, Roopa Purushothaman and Anna Stupnytska (2005) of Goldman Sachs have predicted that China's GDP would surpass 2 Pei (2006b) . 3 According to Minxin Pei (2006b) :"In a 'trapped transition', the ruling elites have little interest in real reforms.
They may pledge reforms, but most such pledges are lip service or tactical adjustments aimed at maintaining the status quo." from this commitment is that the present major social, economic and political trends within China might not lead to a harmonious society or, at least, not lead to a harmonious society fast enough.
Among the disharmonious features mentioned in the fifth paragraph of the "resolutions of the CPC Central Committee on major issues regarding the building of a harmonious socialist society"
were serious imbalance in the social and economic development across (and within each of) China's thirty-one provinces; worsening population and environmental problems; grossly inadequate social safety nets, and medical care system; and serious corruption. The harmonious socialist society proposed by the 6th Plenum would encompass a democratic society under the rule of law; a society based on equality and justice; an honest and caring society; a stable, vigorous and orderly society;
and a society in which humans live in harmony with nature.
What is the origin of the CPC's decision to change its primary focus from "economic construction" to "social harmony"? And why include a target date of 2020? I believe that this switch in emphasis from "economic construction" to "social harmony" occurs because the Hu-Wen leadership is well aware that the political legitimacy of CPC rule rests largely on maintaining, one, an economic growth rate that is high enough to keep unemployment low, and, two, a growth pattern that diffuses the additional income widely enough. Specifically, the Hu -Wen leadership recognises that without accelerated institutional reforms and new major policy initiatives on a broad front, the 1978-2005 policy framework, which had produced an average annual GDP growth rate of almost 10 percent, is at odds with environmental sustainability and with international concerns about China's persistent trade imbalances. More importantly, unless their new policies could produce significant improvements in social harmony by 2020, social instability would reduce China's economic growth, hence, making the leadership of CPC in Chinese politics unsustainable.
To return to the analogy of China's economy being like a speeding car, the Hu-Wen leadership saw that car could crash in the near future because there were several high-probability failures that might occur and cause an economic collapse. To be specific that there are three classes of failures that could occur hardware failure; software failure; and power supply failure.
A hardware failure refers to the breakdown of an economic mechanism, a development that is analogous to the collapse of the chassis of the car. Probable hardware failures include a banking crisis that causes a credit crunch that, in turn, dislocates production economy-wide, and a budget crisis that necessitates reductions in important infrastructure and social expenditure (and also possibly generates high inflation, and balance of payments difficulties as well).
A software failure refers to a flaw in governance that creates frequent widespread social disorders that disrupt production economy-wide and discourage private investment. This situation is similar to a car crash that resulted from a fight among the people inside the speeding car. Software failures could come from the present high-growth strategy creating so much inequality, and corruption that, in turn, generates severe social unrest, which dislocates economic activities; and the state not being responsive enough to rising social expectations, hence causing social disorder.
A power supply failure refers to the economy being unable to move forward because it hits either a natural limit or an externally-imposed limit, a situation that is akin, respectively, to the car running out of gas or to the car smashing into a barrier erected by an outsider. Examples of power supply failures are an environmental collapse, e.g. climate change, and a collapse in China's exports because of a trade war. In a sense, the repair of a power supply failure is more difficult than either the repair of a hardware failure or the repair of a software failure because a large part of the repair has to be undertaken in collaboration with other countries. For example, the lowering of trade barriers requires China to negotiate with other countries; and the reversal of environmental damage could require an advance in scientific understanding, a outcome that is more likely to occur when the entire scientific talent in China and the rest of the world is focused on the task.
The discussion of the many events that could make China's high growth unsustainable is beyond the scope of this paper. I will limit my discussion to one or two of the most likely precipitating events in each class of failures. Section 3 identifies the weakening of China's fiscal position by nonperforming loans in the state banks as the likely type of hardware failure that would occur.
Section 4 discusses the outbreak of social disorder as the likely type of software failure. For power supply failures, I think that the two most likely ones are (a) the erection of trade barriers against China's exports (discussed in Sections 5, 6 and 7); and (b) an environmental collapse, especially a shortage of water (discussed in Section 8).
FISCAL STRESS FROM THE STATE-OWNED BANKS COULD CAUSE HARDWARE FAILURE
Among doomsayers, one favorite mechanism for the forthcoming collapse of an economy is the inevitable fiscal crisis of the state. What is noteworthy is that this fiscal mechanism is used by doomsayers of all stripes. The Marxist economist, James O'Connor (1973) , predicted that the dynamics of capitalist America would precipitate a fiscal crisis that would destabilize the economy completely. In turn, the capitalist lawyer, Gordon Chang (2001) , predicted that a fiscal crisis could be the triggering event in the unavoidable disintegration of socialist China.
This fixation of the doomsayers upon a large negative fiscal shock as a totally destructive systemic shock is understandable because fiscal imbalance is the proximate cause in most crises. The reason is that the state budget is often faced with the task of defusing the cumulative tensions unleashed by deeper, more fundamental social processes. To a first approximation, fiscal capacity is a fundamental determinant of system stability because economic sustainability depends on the ability to cover production costs, and political viability depends on the ability to reward one's supporters and to pay off one's enemies.
The reality in many cases is that fiscal sustainability is the prerequisite for both economic sustainability and political viability, and that economic sustainability and political viability are intricately linked and mutually reinforcing. To see the mutual interdependence of the two, one has only to recall the many times that near-bankrupt governments have been driven out of power after raising the prices of a subsidized item like food, petrol, or foreign exchange.
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One could indeed go so far as to say that the degree of economic and political resilience of a state can be measured by the state's ability to cover an unexpected, prolonged increase in expenditure or an unanticipated, protracted shortfall in revenue.
An OECD (2006) report has raised grave concerns about China's fiscal management.
Specifically: "China's officially reported spending figures reflect only about three-quarters of total government spending. Extra-budgetary spending, social security outlays and central government bond financing of local projects are not part of the official budget. Notwithstanding recent reforms, the government remains overly exposed to extrabudget and off-budget activities, which make public expenditures difficult to plan and control and which impair their accountability and transparency. Contingent liabilities have been a major source of unplanned spending and pose perhaps the greatest risk to the controllability of future expenditure." (pp. 10)
The fact that fiscal sustainability is central to economic management can be seen in the two fiscal targets that the original Growth and Stability Pact of the countries in the Euro-Zone specified for its members to meet the consolidated government budget deficit should not exceed 3 percent of GDP except in case of unusually severe downturn, and the debt-GDP ratio should be brought down to 60 percent or lower. responsibility for in order to preserve economic and social stability. Citigroup (2002) , for example, has estimated that the cost for SOB recapitalization was 46.9 percent of GDP, social security obligations was 26.1 percent, and external debts was 15.6 percent. Should the much higher revised debt-GDP ratio raise concern about China's fiscal sustainability?
Our cautious reading of the evidence is that a fiscal crisis is not imminent in China. China's ratio not only falls within the OECD experience, its worst-case ratio of 114.9 percent is still lower than Italy, which has been performing satisfactorily in overall economic performance. Most importantly, China's ratio is still substantially lower than the highest OECD ratio of 154 percent (Japan). The results of this second recapitalization, and the rapid expansion of loans in the last two years is that the NPL ratio has improved, and the CAR of the Big Four was about 8 percent respectively at the end of 2004.
The important question is how many more rounds of bank recapitalization can China afford without generating a fiscal crisis? The simple fact is that fiscal sustainability lies at the heart of whether a banking crisis would actually occur. As long as the state is perceived to be able and willing to bail out the SOBs, depositors would retain their confidence in the SOBs regardless of the actual state of their balance sheets. Since the stock of publicly acknowledged government debt in 2004 is only about 33 percent of GDP, it is usual to hear official assurances that the current fiscal deficits of less than 2 percent of GDP do not pose a problem for debt servicing by the state.
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However, the current value of the debt-GDP ratio is not a good indicator of the sustainability of the existing fiscal policy regime, a better indicator would involve working out the evolution of the debt-GDP ratio over time.
To put the issue formally, the evolution of the debt-GDP ratio as given by: 
China appears to belong to this case because its post-1978 annual growth rate has averaged 9.4 percent, its growth rate in the next ten years is likely to be above 8 percent; and the real interest rate has been about 4 percent. For the generation of likely future scenarios, I will make the conservative assumptions that y is 8 percent, f is 1 percent, and r is 6 percent.
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It is difficult to predict b, the rate that banks would generate NPLs, because it depends on the type of banking reform undertaken. If no meaningful reforms are undertaken, then b is likely to remain at the historic value of 6 percent.
So conditional on the effectiveness of reforming the SOBs, the steady-state ratio is: The noteworthy finding from above scenarios is that China will produce a level of (Debt/GDP) steady-state that is high by international experience despite the optimistic assumptions that 12 f has been above 1.5 percent for the past seven years. r was 4 percent in the past only because the interest rate was regulated. I think that the implementation of financial deregulation that is necessary for normal healthy development of the financial sector will render r to be at least 6 percent because, one, according to Solow (1991) , the stylised fact for the real interest rate in the United States is that it is 5 to 6 percent; and, two, both the marginal rate of return to capital and the black market loan rate have been more than 20 percent.
long-run growth rate is 8 percent, that that b will be lowered from 6 percent of GDP to 1 percent.
The most optimistic outcome is still two-third larger than what the European Union has set to be the "safe" debt-GDP target (60 percent) for its members. The banking system has made China vulnerable to a fiscal crisis even though there is a theoretical steady-state level for the debt-GDP ratio. Of course, the creation of NPLs cannot be attributed entirely to the SOBs, their chief customers, the embezzlement-ridden and inefficiency-ridden SOEs, 13 deserve an equal share of the blame.
The important point from this second fiscal feature is that the present ongoing recapitalization of the SOBs is the last time that the government can afford to recapitalize the SOBs, and possibly the last time that the government can do so without upsetting confidence in the financial markets about the soundness of China's fiscal regime.
Now, how difficult is it to stop losses in the SOBs in order to ensure fiscal sustainability? The solution lies in imposing a hard budget constraint on the SOBs. SOB managers have to be convinced that the present recapitalization is indeed the last free supper (which the 1998 recapitalization was announced to be), and that their compensation and promotion will depend only on the profitability of the SOBs relative to the profitability of private banks.
At the same time, the prudential supervision and monitoring of bank operations will have to be strengthened to prevent asset stripping and discourage reckless investments fostered by the asymmetrical reward system under the soft budget constraint.14 The operations of SOBs could be further improved by bringing in foreign strategic investors who would be part of the management team, and by removing the influence of the local governments on bank operations.
One additional way to harden the budget constraint faced by the SOBs is to privatize some of their branches, and use the performance of the new private banks to gauge the performance of the remaining SOBs. The privatization of some branches will also help convince the SOB managers that the government is indeed serious about the present SOB recapitalization is indeed the last free supper.
The NPL ratio has stayed low since the second round of recapitalization in 2003. It is, hence, now more frequent to hear claims that the SOBs have improved their internal incentives and risk 13 See Woo, Hai, Jin, and Fan (1994) , and Woo (2001) .
14 The asymmetry is from the absence of financial punishment when a loss occurs. types of malfeasance, the scope of which has not been realized because of the considerable press censorship in China. A parent visiting the brick kilns in her quest to find her son found that the local police were not only unwilling to help but also demanded bribes instead.
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In one case, the brick kiln was owned by the son of the village Party secretary. 20 percent to the poorest 20 percent (11.37) was the highest in Asia; significantly higher than the next highest income ratio (9.47 for Nepal). China is probably the most unequal country in Asia today. Table 2 presents the income inequality in China within the international context. China's income inequality today is generally lower than in Latin America but generally higher than in Africa.
The steady increase in China's income inequality since 1985 raises the possibility that China is heading toward the Latin American degree of income inequality. The reason why doing more of the same economic policies in today's China will not produce the 35 "Income gap in China widens in first quarter," China Daily, June 19, 2005-06. same salubrious results of quick reduction in poverty and slow increase in inequality as in the early phases of economic reform is because the development problems have changed. In the first phase of economic development, the provision of more jobs (through economic deregulation) was enough to lower poverty significantly. At the present, many of the people who are still poor require more than just job opportunities, they need an infusion of assistance (e.g. empowering them with human capital through education and health interventions) first in order to be able to take up these job opportunities. Effective governance for equitable growth has now become even more challenging, and so the probability of improving social harmony has been diminished.
Furthermore, the present mode of economic development also generates immense opportunities for embezzlement of state assets, seizure of farmlands for industrial development, and corruption because of the absence of effective mechanisms to supervise government employees; see Woo (2001) . These features certainly make social harmony hard to sustain.
The data on social unrest are consistent with the hypothesis of rising social disharmony. First, the incidence of public disorder, labeled "social incidents", has risen steadily from 8,700 in 1993 to 32,500 in 1999 and then to 74,000 in 2004. Second, the average number of persons in a mass incident has also risen greatly, from 8 in 1993 to 50 in 2004.
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It should be noted, however, that these numbers might not portray accurately the degree that social unrest has increased because the data include disco brawls and gambling den raids as well as social protests; see EastSouthWestNorth (no date).
Clearly, the number of mass incidents would have been lower if China had better governance.
There would have been more pre-emptive efforts at conflict mediation by the government and less abuse of power by government officials if the government's actions had been monitored closely by an independent mechanism and the government had also been held more accountable for its performance.
One main source of recent social unrest in rural China has been the conversion of farm land to industrial parks without adequate compensation to the farmers. It is interesting therefore that the There have been signs that the leadership under President Hu Jintao is under increasing pressure to undertake drastic political reforms to consolidate the party's grip on power and stamp out widespread corruption."
While there are reasonable grounds for an analyst to doubt either the sincerity of Premier Wen's words or his ability to act on them, the analyst cannot doubt that Premier Wen is at least aware that democracy is one way to solve many of China's problems of governance. The embrace of the Harmonious Society program by the Hu-Wen leadership reveals CPC's acknowledgement that democracy, the rule of law, and a stable income distribution comprise an indivisible combination that is necessary to ensure the social stability that will keep the economy on the high growth path to catch up with the United States (a vision which acts as the bedrock of CPC's legitimacy to rule).
THE FIRST LIKELY TYPE OF POWER SUPPLY FAILURE IS TRADE PROTECTIONISM
China's emergence as a major trading nation has been accompanied by increasing conflicts with the While the trade deficit is many times identified as the cause of the trade tension, the true cause is the ongoing large shift in the international division of labor that has been set in motion by the post-1990 acceleration of globalization and by the continued fast pace of technological innovations. The next two sections will set out the case that the trade tensions reflect, one, the pains of structural adjustment in the United States because of its very inadequate social safety nets (Section 6); and, two, the dysfunctional nature of China's financial system (Section 7).
TRADE PROTECTIONISM AGAINST CHINA CREATED BY DEFECTS IN THE US ECONOMY
It is not uncommon to encounter allegations that the bilateral US-China trade deficit represented the export of unemployment from China to the United States, and that it lowered the wage for labor. These allegations are not supported by the facts, however. Table 3 41 This positive wage trend for the average worker is also seen in that for the average blue-collar worker; see Woo (2008) .
What is fueling the resentment toward imports from China when the median US worker is experiencing neither more unemployment nor lower compensation? The explanation is that the U.S.
worker is feeling more insecure in the 2000s than in the 1980s because of the faster turnover in employment. Globalization and technological innovations have required the worker to change jobs more often and he finds that there are considerable costs associated with the job change because of the inadequacies of the US social safety nets.
The more frequent change in jobs is documented in Table 3 by the declining trend in the length of the median job tenure for older male workers. The median job tenure for males in the: months in the US compared to 12 months in Germany, 9 months in Canada, 30 months in France, 10 months in Japan, and 6 months in Italy and the UK.
There are two major factors behind the more frequent changes in jobs. The first factor is globalization, especially the post-1990 integration of the labor force in the former Soviet Union, India and China (SIC) into the international division of labor. Table 4 shows that the number of workers already engaged in the international division of labor in 1990 was 1,083 million, and the A decade after the start of the deep integration of the SIC economies into the world economic system, the number of workers involved in the international economic system in 2000 had increased to 2,672 million (with 1,363 million workers from SIC); see Table 4 .The Heckscher-Ohlin model would predict that this doubling of the world labor, achieved by bringing in cheaper labor from SIC, would lower the relative price of the labor-intensive good and hence reduce the real wage in the industrialized country.44 Furthermore, the fact that US capital could now move abroad to set up production facilities in the SIC economies to service the US market as well as third markets also gave globalization another channel to lower the US wage. However, the US real wage has not fallen ( Table 3 ). The reason is that the remarkably high US productivity growth since the late 1980s (perhaps enabled in large part by the information and communications technology (ICT) revolution) prevented the real wage from declining. Furthermore, as the import competition is focused on the good that uses low-skilled labor intensively, the wage gap between low-skilled labor and high-skilled labor in the US has widened. In short, the economic impact of globalization in the US is therefore manifested in, one, a diminished labor share of GDP rather than in a lower real wage; and, two, an increased dispersion in US wages.
While the Heckscher-Ohlin model does provide a coherent mechanism for globalization to have the above two wage outcomes, the inconvenient truth is that China might not be the most influential factor in these developments even though China accounted for 764 million of the combined SIC In short, much of the popular outcry in US and EU against China's trade surpluses is misplaced.
A widening of the US trade deficit creates additional stress on US labor because US imports are more labor-intensive than its exports. However, even if China's trade balance were zero, the pains of structural adjustment and income redistribution caused by technological innovations, institutional changes, globalization, and immigration would still be there; and the amount of worker anxiety they generated collectively would be much larger than the additional worker anxiety generated by the widening trade deficit.
The reduction of trade tensions between the US and China would be helped if the US now strengthens its social safety nets to lower the cost of changing jobs. Specifically, the US Congress should quicken the reduction in fiscal imbalance, and expand trade adjustment programs, especially those that upgrade the skill of the younger workers. The Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA)
program still functions inadequately after its overhaul in 2002. Lael Brainard (2007) reported that:
"Participation has remained surprisingly low, thanks in part to confusing Department of Labor interpretations and practices that ultimately deny benefits to roughly threequarters of workers who are certified as eligible for them. TAA has helped fewer than 75,000 new workers per year, while denying more than 40 percent of all employers' petitions. And remarkably, the Department of Labor has interpreted the TAA statute as excluding the growing number of services workers displaced by trade .. Between 2001 and , an average of only 64 percent of participants found jobs while they participated in TAA. And earnings on the new job were more than 20 percent below those prior to displacement." 45 There is a large empirical literature on relative impact of technological changes and globalisation on the US wage rate, e.g. Sachs and Shatz (1994) , and Feenstra and Hanson (1996) . 46 Ottaviano and Peri (2005) are good discussions of this topic.
The TAA program is in clear need of further improvement. Brainard's (2007) proposal for the establishment of wage insurance is an excellent way to bring the US social safety more in line with the type structural adjustments driven by globalization and technological changes.
TRADE PROTECTIONISM AGAINST CHINA CREATED BY DEFECTS IN THE CHINESE ECONOMY
China's chronic and growing overall trade surplus reveals a deep-seated serious problem in China's economy, its dysfunctional financial system. This problem is revealed by the aggregate-level accounting identity that the overall current account balance (of which, in China, the overall trade account is the biggest part) is determined by the fiscal position of the government, and the savingsinvestment decisions of the state-controlled enterprise (SCE) sector and the private sector, which together make up the non-government sector. Why has China's financial system failed to translate the savings into investments? Such an 47 The SCE category covers companies that are classified as SOBs (state-owned companies); and joint-ventures and joint-stock companies which are controlled by third parties (e.g. legal persons)" who are answerable to the state.
outcome was not always the case. Before 1994, the voracious absorption of bank loans by SCEs to invest recklessly kept the current account usually negative and the creation of nonperforming loans (NPLs) high. When the government implemented stricter controls on the state-owned banks (SOBs) from 1994 onward (e.g. removing top bank officials whenever their bank lent more than its credit quota or allowed the NPL ratio to increase too rapidly), the SOBs slowed down the growth of loans to SCEs. This cutback created an excess of savings because the SOB-dominated financial sector did not then re-channel the released savings (which were also increasing) to finance the investment of the private sector. This failure in financial intermediation by the SOBs is quite understandable.
Firstly, the legal status of private enterprises was, until recently, lower than that of the state enterprises; and, secondly, there was no reliable way to assess the balance sheets of the private enterprises, which were naturally eager to escape taxation. The upshot was that the residual excess In discussions on the rise of the savings rate, a common view is that the rise reflects the uncertainty about the future that many SOE workers feel in the face of widespread privatization of loss-making SOEs. We find this explanation incomplete because it seems that there also been a rise in the rural saving rate even though rural residents have little to fear about the loss of jobs in the state-enterprise sector because none of them is employed there.
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We see two general changes that have caused both urban and rural saving rates to rise significantly. The first is "increased worries about the future". The steady decline in state subsidies to 48 Economist Intelligence Unit (2004, pp. 23) reported that "farmers' propensity to save seems to have increased." medical care, housing, loss-making enterprises, and education, and mismanagement of pension funds by the state have led people to save more to insure against future bad luck (e.g. sickness, job loss), buy their own lodging, build up nest eggs for retirement, and invest in their children.
The second change is the secular improvement in the official Chinese attitude toward market capitalism. Given the high rate of return to capital, this increasingly business-friendly attitude the Communist Party of China has encouraged both rural and urban residents to save for investment, i.e.
greater optimism about the future has spawned investment-motivated saving.
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In our explanations for the existence of the current account surpluses and the growth of the surplus, there is a common element in both and that common element is China's financial system.
The fact is that savings behavior is not independent of the sophistication of the financial system. An advanced financial system will have a variety of financial institutions that would enable pooling of risks by providing medical insurance, pension insurance, and unemployment insurance; and transform savings into education loans, housing loans, and other types of investment loans to the private sector. Ceteris paribus, the more sophisticated a financial system, the lower the savings rate.
China generates the current account surplus shown in Figure 2 because of inadequate financial intermediation, and the surplus grows over time because the dysfunctional financial system fails to pool risks to reduce uncertainty-induced savings and fails to provide loans to reduce investmentmotivated saving.
What is to be done in China? The obvious short-run policy package has three components. First, the steady process of yuan appreciation begun in July 2005 should be quickened, and be used more aggressively as an anti-inflation instrument. Second, import liberalisation should be accelerated (e.g. implement seriously the commitments made in negotiations for WTO membership like IPR protection) and expanded beyond WTO specifications.
The third component of the short-run policy package is to have an expansionary fiscal policy (e.g. rural infrastructure investments) to soak up the excess savings, with an emphasis on importintensive investments (e.g. buying airplanes and sending students abroad). It is important that time limits be put on the expanded public works and SCE investments because, in the long-run, the increased public investments could follow an increasingly rent-seeking path that is wasteful (e.g building a second big bridge to a lowly-populated island to benefit a politically-connected construction company as in Japan), and the increased SCE investments could convert themselves into nonperforming loans at the SOBs.
Clearly, the optimum solution to the problem of excess saving is not for the government to absorb it by increasing its budget deficit but to establish an improved mechanism for coordinating private savings and private investments. The establishment of a modern financial system will not only achieve the objective of intermediating all of domestic saving into domestic investment, it will also enhance welfare and lower the savings rate by pooling risks through vehicles like medical insurance and pension insurance. In a nutshell, China's main challenge today is to develop smoothly-functioning financial, planning, and regulatory systems that can employ the remaining rural surplus labor (as indicated by an average wage of about $120 per month for 480 million rural and migrant workers) and surplus capital, which now shows up now as China's sustained current account surplus and rising foreign exchange reserves.
The important conclusion from this section is that US-China trade tension would be lowered much more if both countries undertake corrective policies rather than if China acted alone, and that a wider range of policy instruments should be employed (e.g. wage insurance program in US and financial market development in China) rather than relying just on exchange rate adjustment alone.
THE SECOND LIKELY TYPE OF POWER SUPPLY FAILURE IS ENVIRONMENTAL COLLAPSE IN CHINA
The present mode of economic development has given China the dirtiest air in the world, is polluting more and more of the water resources, and, is, possibly, changing the climate pattern within China. The reality is that CPC's new objective of living in harmony with nature is not a choice because the Maoist adage of "man conquering nature" is just as unrealistic as creating prosperity through central planning. China's fast growth in the last two decades has done substantial damage to the environmental. Elizabeth Economy (2004, pp. 18-19) summarized the economic toll as follows:
"China has become home to six of the ten most polluted cities in the world. Water shortage appears to pose the most immediate environmental threat to China's continued high growth. 53 Presently, China uses 67 to 75 percent of the 800 to 900 billion cubic meters of water available annually, and present trends in water consumption would project the usage rate in 2030 to be 78 to 100 percent.
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The present water situation is actually already fairly critical because of the uneven distribution of water and the lower than normal rainfall in the past fifteen years. Right now, "[about] 400 of China's 660 cities face water shortages, with 110 of them severely short." 55 The extended period of semi-drought in northern China combined with the economic and population growth have caused more and more water to be pumped from the aquifers, leading the water table to drop three to six meters a year. 56 And a study using measurements from satellites (the Global Positioning System) has established that the part of China north of the 36th parallel latitude has been "sinking at the rate of 2 mm a year." 57 Specifically, "Shanghai, Tianjin, and Taiyuan are the worst hit in China, with each sinking more than two meters (6.6 feet) since the early 1990s."
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The overall water situation in northern China is reflected in the fate of the Yellow River, "which started drying up every few years from 1972, did so for increasing periods of time over longer distances in the 1990s until 1997, when it dried up for almost the entire year over a stretch of several hundred kilometres."
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The utilization rate of Yellow River's water is 60 percent, far exceeding the internationally recommended utilization limit of 40 percent. All the mentioned factors have contributed to lowering the "amount of Yellow River water feeding into the Bohai Sea" from an annual 49.6 billion cubic meters in the 1960s to 14.2 billion cubic meters in the 1990s to the present 4.65 billion cubic meters.60
Water shortage and the increasing pollution of what water there is61 are not the only serious environmental threats to the economy of northern China. The desert is expanding (possibly, at an accelerating pace), and man appears to be the chief culprit. The State Forestry Administration reported that 28 percent of the country's land mass was affected by desertification in 1999, and 37 percent was affected by soil erosion. The report identified about 65 percent of the desert as having been created by "over-cultivation, overgrazing, deforestation and poor irrigation practices." 62 The rate of desertification is 3,900 square miles a year, 63 an annual loss of a land area twice the size of Delaware. One direct upshot is a great increase in the frequency of major sandstorms There is, however, the unhappy possibility that neither the price mechanism nor the three canals can solve China's water problem and make its growth sustainable unless the present mode of economic development is drastically amended. There is now persuasive evidence that China's voluminous emission of black carbon (particles of incompletely combusted carbon) has contributed significantly to the shift to a climate pattern that produces northern droughts and southern floods of increasing intensity. China's massive reforestation program will not succeed in reducing sandstorms in the north because trees cannot survive if the amount of rainfall is declining over time; and the number of south-north canals will have to be increased over time in order to meet the demand for water in northern China; until China reduces its emission of black carbon significantly (presuming no new large emissions from neighboring countries like India).
The general point is that effective policy-making on the environmental front is a very difficult task because much of the science about the problem is not known. For example, China must no longer select its water strategy and it energy strategy separately. A systems approach in policymaking is necessary because the interaction among the outcomes from the different sectoral policies can generate serious unintended environmental damage. The worrying sign is that there might not be significant progress in the near future because of the concern that environmental protection might slow growth down too much. This concern might be the reason for the suspension of the release of green GDP estimates China should now seek a leadership role in the Doha Round negotiations that is commensurate with its participation in international trade. Failure of the Doha Round could set in motion the unraveling of multilateral free trade because the present international atmosphere is right for protectionism. The US, which has traditionally been at the forefront for expanding the multilateral free trade system, is now beset by self-doubt for three major reasons.
First, the US was willing to put up with the pains of structural adjustments in the period to accommodate the growing imports from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and ASEAN because they were frontline allies in the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War, it is natural for the US to re-consider the economic cost of structural adjustment because the security and ideological benefits from it have gone down.
Second, the amount of required structural adjustment in the US to accommodate the rise of the SIC bloc is far greater than the earlier adjustment to the rise of its Cold War allies. As noted, the entry of the former Soviet, Indian and Chinese economies has doubled the labor force participating in the international division of labor. Such a role will be very much in China's interest because Brazil is now bypassing multilateral trade liberalization by entering into FTA negotiations with the European Union. The fact is that a growing number of nations like Brazil "are increasingly wary of a multilateral deal because it would mandate tariff cuts, exposing them more deeply to low-cost competition from China. Instead, they are seeking bilateral deals with rich countries that are tailored to the two parties' needs."
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It is the time for China to show that it is a responsible stakeholder by joining in the stewardship of the multilateral free trade system.
The global environment is the second area where China can help to build a harmonious world system. Specifically, China should be mobilizing international consensus to form an international research consortium to develop ways to burn coal cleanly because China is now building a power station a week and is hence able to facilitate extensive experimentation on prototype plants to burn coal cleanly. If successful, this global cooperation on clean energy research will unleash sustainable development in China as well as in the rest of the world.
We realize of course that while the need to maintain high growth could motivate China to become more active in supplying global public goods, it might not be allowed to do so however because of the usual reluctance of the existing dominant powers to share the commanding heights of the world political leadership. The sad experience of Japan being denied permanent membership in the Security Council of the United Nations is a case in point. Harmonious international relations are the omitted item in China's perception of a Harmonious Society in 2006, and it could turn out to be a very soft spot in the Chinese growth engine.
Besides the adept management of international relations, the competent management of economic issues is also fundamental to maintaining China's high growth path. The most important realization on this front is that in today's China, doing more of the same economic policies will not produce the same salubrious results on every front because the development problems have changed.
For example, in the first phase of economic development, the provision of more jobs (through economic deregulation) was enough to lower poverty significantly. At the present, many of the people who are still poor require more than just job opportunities, they need an infusion of assistance (e.g. empower them with human capital through education and health interventions) first in order to be able to take up these job opportunities. This is why the poverty rate (defined by a poverty line of a daily income of US$1) in China has stayed at about 11 percent since 1998.
On the fiscal management front, my analysis suggests two main policy suggestions to reduce the vulnerability of China to possible future fiscal difficulties. First, the extractive capacity of the state should be enhanced so that the revenue-GDP ratio would increase to 25 percent in the medium term. This extra revenue will be the fiscal cushion that allows the state to accommodate unexpected expenditure demands or revenue shortfalls. As noted in the paper, the collection of revenue might probably first require overcoming the challenge of forging the political consensus for a tax increase.
Second, the management of state assets and the regulation of the financial sector should be reformed to eliminate the phenomenon of repeated recapitalization of the SOBs. The privatization of some units of the SOBs, and the emergence of large domestic private banks will help in strengthening the budget constraints perceived by the managers of SOBs.
The fact is, however, that the probability of a software failure and the probability of a power supply failure are both higher than the probability of a hardware failure. This means that development policymaking in China has become more challenging. There must now not only be more adroit, but also fuller accommodation, of domestic social demands in order to keep China's growth rate high. The reality is that popular satisfaction with the status quo depends inversely on the Complicating matters is that there has not been just rising expectations but also diversification of expectations. In this new situation, the greater use of democratic procedures, the establishment of an independent judiciary, and the restoration of a free press might be inevitable if CPC is to successfully accommodate the rising social expectations and mediate the emerging differences in social expectations. What will happen will depend on whether the CPC is sufficiently confident that it will be politically skillful enough to lead the democratic transition and emerge afterward as the most important political force. History tells us that the French monarchy and the British monarchy reacted very differently to the popular requests for reform, and the outcomes were very different in each case.
